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Summary 1 
Reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD+) has emerged as a potentially 2 
important component of the global policy-mix to mitigate climate change. Against a background of 3 
increasing engagement between private-sector entities and conservation organisations, private 4 
sector investment has emerged in REDD+. Despite slow developments at the international scale, 5 
there continues to be private sector interest in REDD+, and continued voluntary investments in 6 
REDD+ projects and initiatives.  7 
In order to better understand possible models for private sector engagement in REDD+, this paper 8 
analyses the motivation of private sector stakeholders to engage in REDD+, the perception of the 9 
potential of REDD+, the critical obstacles to making REDD+ functional and how actors perceive 10 
themselves as part of future REDD+ scenarios.  11 
Based on interviews and a workshop with private sector actors, this paper finds that few expect a 12 
regulatory market for REDD+ to emerge and that credits from the voluntary market have to be 13 
tailored to specific needs. As a carbon offset, REDD+ provides insufficient motivation for investment, 14 
particularly if cheaper alternatives exist. Co-benefits such as biodiversity conservation and 15 
community development are more important when traditional corporate social responsibility (CSR) 16 
motivations play a role.  17 
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Project scale remains important not only for the fact that smaller projects are viewed as offering 18 
more visible benefits to stakeholders but also as a means of having more control over risks on the 19 
ground, posing a challenge for the design of jurisdictional REDD+. Moving towards supply chains that 20 
are free from deforestation offers an opportunity to tackle commodity-driven deforestation. While 21 
questions remain about how such an approach might be integrated into REDD+, it could help 22 
address a perceived gap between private sector understanding of the values of REDD+ and the risks 23 
associated with these values not arising - termed here as a ‘missing middle’.  24 
Introduction   25 
The private sector has been traditionally viewed as being in conflict with organisations aiming to 26 
conserve the environment (Ehrenfeld 2003), but this has shifted with increasing engagement 27 
between private sector entities and conservation organisations (Rose & Colchester 2004; 28 
Brockington & Duffy 2011). The idea that firms can benefit society and the environment while 29 
making profits, has taken root; firms across the economy are being held accountable to this by 30 
conservation organisations and consumers (TEEB 2010; Robinson 2012).  31 
Such corporate greening (the discovery by business of the cost, innovation and marketing 32 
advantages of improving environmental performance, Guziana 2013) has grown hand-in-hand with 33 
the development of CSR programmes (Robinson 2012) that emerged as part of the corporate 34 
response to the challenges of environmental damage and climate change (Kolk & Pinkse 2004) but 35 
are also often viewed as important marketing strategies (McWilliams & Siegel 2001; Kitzmuller et al. 36 
2012). Multi-national companies in particular have high incentives to engage in CSR as a way to 37 
reduce reputational risks (Ruggie 2008), with many seeing CSR programmes as effectively a licence 38 
to operate (Earthwatch et al. 2002).  39 
Beyond CSR, opportunities have been identified for businesses to profit directly from engagement 40 
with conservation including the development of new markets for ecosystem services (TEEB 2010). 41 
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Climate change policy, in particular, has witnessed great change in the 2000s, both with respect to 42 
regulations and markets established by governments, as well as voluntary initiatives and largely 43 
unregulated carbon offset markets. With tropical deforestation and forest degradation estimated to 44 
account for approximately 15% of global anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (van der Werf et 45 
al. 2009), stakeholders, ranging from international organisations and national governments to 46 
conservation organisations and the private sector, have sought to design strategies and policies for 47 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+). 48 
REDD+ was first termed by the United Nations Framework on Climate Change (UNFCCC), with 49 
member countries initially focusing on it as an essential and time-limited contribution to mitigate 50 
the impacts of climate change. In its simplest form, governments and firms would reward tropical 51 
countries for reducing deforestation rates, receiving carbon credits in return. Cap-and-trade 52 
schemes like the European Union’s Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) were touted as a way of 53 
establishing a price for forest carbon stocks. Since 2005, and in spite of initial high motivation and 54 
commitment from many stakeholders, including national governments, local communities, 55 
conservationist NGOs and the private sector (Palmer & Engel 2009; Nhantumbo 2011), progress in 56 
REDD+ has been slow.  57 
In mid-2015, the final framework for REDD+ suggested broad agreement in its overall scope, 58 
objectives and monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) (Meyer 2015). The scope of REDD+ has, 59 
however, increased dramatically from early proposals for a tool targeting reduced deforestation at 60 
project scale, funded by firms purchasing carbon credits, to potentially nation-wide programmes 61 
targeting deforestation, degradation and re-forestation, known as ‘Jurisdictional and Nested REDD+’ 62 
(JNR). Between 2005 and 2015, many policy initiatives and experiments have claimed the mantle of 63 
REDD+, at all scales, involving a range of stakeholders, from Norway’s investments in national 64 
programmes in Indonesia (Lee & Pistorius 2015), to Bosques Amazonicos (a Peruvian company) 65 
supporting organic certification of Brazil nuts in Madre de Dios (Peru) to encourage illegal gold 66 
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miners to switch activities (IGES 2013). The critical need to stem tropical deforestation, whether for 67 
climate reasons or otherwise, is generally agreed upon, but concerns have been raised regarding the 68 
potential efficacy of REDD+ to reduce deforestation, including doubts over cost (Gregersen et al. 69 
2010), infringements on local community rights (Larson 2011), and debates about how permanent 70 
reductions in deforestation might be achieved (Palmer 2011). This last issue is partially related to 71 
how REDD+ might be implemented on the ground, in terms of the policies, and extent to which 72 
these address underlying drivers of deforestation (see Angelsen 2010). 73 
Many scholars and practitioners nevertheless agree that to work in practice, REDD+ needs to be 74 
implemented at a scale that includes as much of the world’s tropical forest as possible in order to 75 
prevent ‘leakage’, defined as reductions of carbon emissions in one place causing emissions in 76 
another (Atmadja & Verchot 2011). Such scale would require a huge level of financing yet UNFCCC 77 
negotiations have failed to resolve the financing issue due to continuing disagreements among 78 
countries about who should pay and how (Leonard 2015). To date, finance flowing into REDD+ has 79 
been dominated by public funding from richer countries, significantly through Norway’s agreements 80 
with Brazil, Indonesia and Guyana. The private sector has engaged with REDD+ for a wide range of 81 
voluntary reasons including offsetting of emissions, greening of supply-chains and counterbalancing 82 
potential future risk (Corbera & Schroeder 2011). Opportunities to profit have also arisen, for 83 
example from trading in REDD+ credits.  84 
Private sector commitment to REDD+ has been strengthened through the New York Declaration on 85 
Forests, signed by 53 multinational companies and 37 governments, that pledges to halve 86 
deforestation by 2020 and end it by 2030 (UN 2014). A number of multi-nationals have recently 87 
committed to the goal of zero net deforestation, for example, Procter and Gamble have committed 88 
to eliminating deforestation across its palm oil supply chain by 2020 (Shankleman 2014).  89 
Page 4 of 34
Proof for Review
5 
 
 
Existing literature on private sector involvement in REDD+ frames the issue as a mismatch between 90 
supply and demand. Conservation International (2013) (CI) estimated that REDD+ projects in 91 
existence represent more than three times current voluntary market demand, while the Global 92 
Canopy Programme (GCP) et al. (2014) estimate demand for REDD+ could be as little as 3% of supply 93 
between 2015 and 2020. Despite the continued absence of REDD+ from existing regulatory schemes 94 
such as the EU ETS, the fact that the private sector continues to invest in REDD+ raises the question 95 
of what motivates them to do so. 96 
The term ‘REDD+’ is nebulous and has been used to cover a range of activities concerning forests. Its 97 
scope has grown in the official UNFCCC proceedings from Reducing Emissions from Deforestation 98 
(RED) to include degradation (REDD) and then conservation of standing forests and reforestation 99 
(REDD+). REDD+ is, however, generally used as a catch-all term for projects and policies that are 100 
intended to avoid and reduce deforestation and forest degradation and contribute to regrowth of 101 
new forests. Since it has also grown in scale, initially focusing on project-based approaches before 102 
encompassing jurisdictional approaches at a regional or national scale, this paper adopts a broad 103 
definition, i.e., including projects and policies that fall both inside and outside the official UNFCCC 104 
process, and activities implemented at project and jurisdictional scales, funded both under 105 
regulatory schemes and through voluntary markets (Supplementary Material S1).  106 
Drawing on data from interviews and a workshop with private sector actors, this paper has a number 107 
of key objectives: it examines motivations of firms engaging in REDD+ for their investments and 108 
purchases of credits; decision-making procedures of those currently engaging in REDD+; barriers and 109 
risks that have prevented additional investors from engaging with REDD+; and, how private-sector 110 
stakeholders perceive REDD+ in the future.   111 
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Methodology 112 
Views of private sector stakeholders participating in REDD+ were evaluated in a two-step process. In 113 
the first, semi-structured one-to-one interviews, following interview guides (Supplementary Material 114 
S2), were conducted with fourteen individuals. An initial mapping exercise was undertaken of key 115 
organisations involved in REDD+ located in Europe. The exercise focused on firms currently investing 116 
in REDD+, those investing in other types of carbon offsets, associations representing emitting 117 
industries and REDD+ investors, commodity purchasers and carbon-market traders. Contact was 118 
made with firms, organisations and individuals and interviews were scheduled. Further contacts 119 
were made and interviewed via snowball sampling. 120 
Interviews were conducted between December 2013 and June 2014 at the London School of 121 
Economics (LSE) and across London. Four participants were not available to meet in person so phone 122 
and Skype interviews were conducted.  123 
The focus was on firms that had either provided investment into REDD+ projects or purchased 124 
REDD+ credits, rather than project developers. Motivations and risks associated with developers are 125 
different from those of middle-men looking to purchase credits and sell them on, and different again 126 
from those looking to directly invest in REDD+ projects or purchase credits emanating from such 127 
projects. Therefore, unless explicitly stated the firms, or entities, referred to here are those investing 128 
in REDD+ or purchasing credits.  129 
Questions focused on the potential interest of purchasers in REDD+, motivations of existing REDD+ 130 
purchasers, key decision-makers regarding offsetting in firms, time horizons of firms engaging (or 131 
not) in REDD+ and main barriers for engaging private sector finance in REDD+ (Supplementary 132 
material S2). 133 
In a second step a workshop was held under Chatham House rules at LSE in April 2014. Nineteen 134 
participants were involved, drawn from the REDD+ working groups of the Carbon Market Investors 135 
Page 6 of 34
Proof for Review
7 
 
 
Association (CMIA) and the International Emissions Trading Association (IETA). They included 136 
representatives of project developers, investors, international donors and a range of companies who 137 
provided legal and institutional support to REDD+ projects. While they shared a background similar 138 
to those selected for interview, they were mutually exclusive, in order to allow us to check the 139 
validity of hypotheses developed on the basis of interviews.  140 
The workshop was structured around three main sessions focusing on: where does REDD+ stand 141 
today; barriers and risks for REDD+; and the future for REDD+ (Supplementary Material S3). Each 142 
session started with a brief presentation that raised findings from interviews, followed by open 143 
discussion to validate findings and raise fresh perspectives. 144 
Results 145 
Motivations of private sector stakeholders  146 
Preparatory and pre-regulatory demand 147 
A key question asked of interviewees was their perception of motivations of existing REDD+ 148 
purchasers. Responses varied, but a conclusion from all interviewees was a dichotomy between 149 
those investing for purely voluntary reasons, and those anticipating REDD+ being used in regulatory 150 
markets. Interviews with two REDD+ market experts (and validated at the workshop) led to the 151 
determination of two different categories of investors in the latter area.  The first were those who 152 
faced potential future regulatory obligations and were looking to engage with REDD+ in order to gain 153 
experience. It was the consensus of participants to the workshop that this type of demand had 154 
declined recently due to declining prospects for REDD+ in regulatory markets. It was raised, both in 155 
interviews with emitting industry associations and at the workshop, that for entities looking to meet 156 
regulatory targets, the main factor determining whether they should engage in offsetting or not was 157 
minimising costs.  158 
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The second category of investors identified were those companies motivated by resale opportunities 159 
that investing in REDD+ might bring. A workshop participant suggested that this type of investor had 160 
also declined, not only due to the reduced short-term prospects for REDD+ in regulatory markets, 161 
but also due to the experiences of early investors in projects that were perceived to have failed.  162 
Corporate social responsibility and offsetting  163 
For those companies looking to engage in REDD+ for voluntary reasons the motivations discussed by 164 
REDD+ purchasing interviewees and at the workshop were markedly different from those of pre-165 
regulatory entities. Discussions at the workshop can be succinctly summed up by the phrase used by 166 
a workshop participant when discussing the motivations for financing REDD+: ‘it’s all about the 167 
story’, suggesting that what was crucial was the message that could be communicated to 168 
stakeholders. A workshop attendee with experience in marketing REDD+ credits however, raised the 169 
cogent point that to a number of companies the story of REDD+ was currently unattractive. REDD+ 170 
was predominantly viewed as actors being paid to stop cutting down the rainforest. In the 171 
workshop, this prompted the question raised by one participant of ‘why should I pay someone to 172 
stop doing something?’ In the discussions that followed participants reached the consensus that the 173 
idea of paying for something tangible, like building an eco-lodge, was more attractive. This moves 174 
away from the idea of REDD+ as an ‘emission reduction story’ - the traditional view as observed by a 175 
workshop participant, where REDD+ is perceived merely as a tool to offset emissions - towards the 176 
role of co-benefits, for example, biodiversity protection. While such co-benefits were initially viewed 177 
as ‘the cherry on the top for REDD+’ by workshop participants, i.e. as an additional benefit above 178 
and beyond the planned objective, the discussion concluded that they should now be seen as 179 
playing a central role in investment decisions.  180 
An existing REDD+ purchaser interviewee highlighted that for firms looking to engage as part of their 181 
CSR programmes, the relevance of projects to their overall strategic direction was also important, 182 
and it was this relevance that had helped determine the decision to invest in REDD+ in their 183 
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organisation. Such firms looked to projects that offered wide benefits, and fitted within their 184 
corporate strategies, including a consideration of their customers. For example, a key business 185 
sustainability leader interviewee revealed that REDD+ was of particular relevance to firms with 186 
supply chains extending into forest landscapes. 187 
A more hands-on approach to REDD+, where investors engage directly with the project on the 188 
ground, was reported by two interviewees to have not only helped make REDD+ attractive but also 189 
enabled greater control over risk. For one interviewee, such an approach was motivating firms to 190 
make direct investments in organisations that developed REDD+ initiatives and projects. An example 191 
of this approach is Kering, a luxury goods company, investing into Wildlife Works, a REDD+ project 192 
developer, (Supplementary Material S4).   193 
With regard to the price sensitivity of CSR investors, in analysing interviews and results of the 194 
workshop, it became useful to differentiate between those seeking to use REDD+ credits for CSR 195 
only and those seeking to use it for carbon-neutral CSR (i.e. voluntarily offsetting a company’s 196 
emissions). When the question regarding price sensitivity was raised at the workshop it was the 197 
consensus that prices did not seem to be important for the former, who were reported to often view 198 
the purchase of REDD+ credits, as described by one participant, as a ‘charitable donation’. The latter 199 
group, however, tended to care more about prices; with the overall aim of offsetting their emissions 200 
as cheap as possible. They were only willing to pay higher prices if projects were charismatic and 201 
generated wider public relations (PR) benefits. Such firms, one interviewee ventured, often 202 
purchased large volumes of cheap offsets in order to cover the majority of emissions (e.g. renewable 203 
energy or industrial gas destruction), and a small volume of relatively more expensive REDD+ offsets 204 
with co-benefits.        205 
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Other potential sources of demand 206 
New pockets of demand have begun to emerge with little or no regulation from government. 207 
Instead, they have developed as a result of direct or indirect action in the private sector, responding 208 
either to internal drivers, such as the desire to move towards green supply chains, or external 209 
private sector-led drivers, such as through sustainability indices.  210 
Charitable donations were identified at the workshop as being targeted by REDD+ project 211 
developers. A number of large philanthropic foundations have already been active including the 212 
MacArthur Foundation and the Clinton Foundation (PwC et al. 2011). For example, the latter has 213 
supported carbon monitoring in countries such as Guyana, while the MacArthur Foundation has a 214 
dedicated programme aiming to minimise deforestation in countries like the Democratic Republic of 215 
Congo. 216 
Other sources of demand for REDD+ identified by participants included incentives provided by 217 
sustainability targets, such as the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI), that evaluates the 218 
sustainability performance of the largest 2,500 companies listed on the Dow Jones Global Total 219 
Stock Market Index. 220 
In a discussion at the workshop a participant with experience in seeking new markets for REDD+ 221 
reported that they were investigating demand from companies potentially exposed to significant risk 222 
from their investments in carbon-intensive assets that could become stranded if climate or energy 223 
regulation is tightened (‘stranded assets’). The Generation Foundation (2013) identified market 224 
forces and socio-political pressure, along with regulation, as risks that could lead to significant 225 
stranding of fossil-fuel intensive assets. Thus, large institutional investors, such as pension funds, 226 
could potentially diversify their portfolio away from companies holding potentially stranded assets, 227 
towards less-risky opportunities that might thrive in a low-carbon future. The extent to which such 228 
opportunities might include REDD+ would depend on the barriers and risks encountered. 229 
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Decision procedures, barriers and risks  230 
Different decision-making procedures and time horizons   231 
Participants were asked who the key REDD+ decision-makers were in their respective firms. For 232 
those engaged in purchasing for CSR, decision-making generally lay with the CSR department, 233 
although in some instances decision-making went all the way to the CEO. Decision-making within 234 
CSR departments implies that finance for REDD+ comes out of general CSR budgets, and workshop 235 
participants highlighted the implications for the time horizon of those investments. With CSR 236 
budgets generally decided annually, investments often fluctuate from year-to-year. One participant 237 
responded (and there was general agreement subsequently) that, for voluntary purchases for CSR, 238 
horizons were not more than five years and often much shorter, suggesting a severe disconnect 239 
between financing for REDD+ and the typically longer timeframe of many REDD+ projects - rates of 240 
carbon sequestration determine that newly-planted forests take decades to reach maturity.  241 
A new type of REDD+ project from which investors receive not only REDD+ credits but also 242 
sustainably-sourced commodities was identified as a key potential future source of demand by a 243 
participant involved in developing projects, with longer time horizons than for CSR projects.   244 
Barriers, obstacles and risks  245 
Preparatory and pre-compliance market demand   246 
Initially raised by an emitting industry association interviewee, and validated at the workshop, was 247 
the perception that many stakeholders, especially those anticipating regulatory markets, view a lack 248 
of regulatory frameworks and a lack of clarity regarding future regulations as a major barrier to 249 
investing in REDD+. Concerns were also raised by both potential purchasers (through emitting 250 
industry associations) and suppliers (through project developers at the workshop) over actual 251 
emergence of regulatory markets and REDD+’s eligibility into such markets. Emerging pilot 252 
institutions and procedures to register projects were perceived by project developers as being too 253 
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bureaucratic, with a lack of clarity regarding the types of projects that would be allowed to generate 254 
credits and conditions under which they might be created.  255 
In addition, these investors were deemed by a project developer to be the most price-sensitive and 256 
were also concerned with technical risks relating to REDD+ such as additionality, leakage and 257 
permanence (see Palmer & Engel 2009; Palmer 2011). It was the view of the same project developer 258 
that these risks were likely to be incorporated into criteria that would allow entry of REDD+ into 259 
regulatory markets and thus are likely to form part of the risk-assessment of any regulatory 260 
purchasers.  261 
Voluntary demand 262 
Risks related to investments in the voluntary market were perceived, by both interviewees and at 263 
the workshop, to be different from regulatory investments. A major barrier, identified by a 264 
participant marketing REDD+ projects, was the current low profitability and expectations of future 265 
low profitability of REDD+ projects that generate revenues from the sale of credits. Price was 266 
deemed, in interviews with market experts, to be less important to investors with more general CSR 267 
motivations.  268 
Project failure has great potential to damage the reputations of stakeholders involved, and has been 269 
a common theme of many REDD+ projects to date, for example the Ulu Masen REDD+ 270 
demonstration project in Aceh (Indonesia) (Supplementary Material S5). However, the private sector 271 
faces a challenge in measuring, quantifying and understanding reputational risks associated with 272 
REDD+, particularly given the range of activities, initiatives, countries and contexts. Reducing 273 
reputational risk, or at least helping companies understand and quantify the risk could, in the view 274 
of participants, provide further impetus for companies to scale-up investment in REDD+. There are 275 
private sector institutions that already perform this role to some extent in the form of standards (for 276 
example The Verified Carbon Standard). However, at present these standards are extremely 277 
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stringent, require huge effort and finance, and were highlighted by project developers, as a major 278 
barrier of entry to the market.  279 
Supply chain greening risks  280 
The potential for REDD+ to find investment from companies looking to improve environmental 281 
performance in supply chains, and promote sustainable agricultural activities, was raised by a 282 
commodity trader interviewee and repeated by others including existing REDD+ purchasers. A 283 
commodity market expert interviewee proposed a mechanism for firms to certify commodities as 284 
being ‘deforestation-free’ via a trading mechanism with other firms, when zero deforestation 285 
sourcing is not possible within their own supply-chains. At the workshop a REDD+ market expert 286 
participant reported that there have been some moves toward such tools through initiatives such as 287 
the Round Table on Sustainable Palm Oil. These, however, have encountered heavy criticism with 288 
accusations of weak standards and continued deforestation in members’ concessions (Greenpeace 289 
2013). The same market expert commented that more research was required to exploit the 290 
potentially large synergy between REDD+ and the move toward sustainable supply chains.  291 
REDD+’s missing middle: The difficulty for private sector stakeholders to 292 
understand the complexity of REDD+ 293 
The workshop set out to understand two key aspects of the current market: the value or services 294 
that private sector actors obtain from REDD+, and, the risks that these values or services may fail to 295 
emerge. Although participants recognised the importance of both, discussions also raised a further 296 
dimension: a broad lack of understanding of REDD+ in the private sector inclusive of its values and 297 
risks, characterised here as REDD+’s ‘missing middle’. 298 
Informed by discussions at the workshop this missing middle is conceptualised as consisting of three 299 
elements: a lack of understanding of the values that REDD+ can bring to the private sector 300 
(highlighted above with regard to the lack of an attractive story for REDD+); a lack of understanding 301 
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of the risks associated with REDD+ (demonstrated above in the discussion regarding difficulties in 302 
understanding and valuing reputational risks); and, a lack of understanding regarding the mapping of 303 
risks on to values.  304 
Future scenarios for private sector involvement into REDD+  305 
In a discussion on the relative attractiveness of different scales of REDD+ projects a participant with 306 
experience of marketing REDD+ commented that CSR purchasers preferred ‘small, nice, cuddly’ 307 
projects, and the ownership, control and PR benefits these can offer in contrast to JNR. In the 308 
discussion that followed a market expert raised the perception that there were fears from some 309 
buyers of working too closely with national or regional governments due to issues of corruption, 310 
further reducing the attractiveness of JNR vis-à-vis project-scale. Countering this, however, was the 311 
opinion raised by a project developer that firms wanted projects to be embedded in overall JNR 312 
frameworks, as these were more likely to reduce technical issues such as leakage.  313 
Participants of the workshop were almost equally split over the future of REDD+. The first camp held 314 
that under clarified institutional settings and rules, REDD+ could eventually re-gain momentum, 315 
while the second expressed high uncertainty in this regard. Unless a robust framework for regulatory 316 
markets emerges, for instance through JNR, it was the perception of a market expert that private 317 
sector stakeholders preferred to participate in efforts to reduce emissions from deforestation and 318 
forest degradation in a narrower context. A point of consensus across the workshop, and also seen 319 
in interviews with market experts, is the likely move away from REDD+ being the focal point of 320 
projects and activities, in the sense that the main motivation of firms investing was carbon credits. 321 
Instead, firms are looking for wider benefits from their investment, with multiple sources of income. 322 
There is an increasing focus on other benefits that arise from projects that aim to reduce 323 
deforestation and generate a return in other ways, such as agro-forestry.  324 
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Discussion and Conclusion  325 
REDD+’s brief history has been marked by periods of optimism and pessimism. The current mood in 326 
the private sector is generally pessimistic, with doubts over the emergence of regulatory demand 327 
and supply of credits outstripping demand, reported both by participants and in the literature (CI 328 
2013; GCP et al. 2014; Forest Trends 2014). While reportedly in decline, the finding that resale 329 
opportunities from investing in REDD+ remain is mirrored by Forest Trends (2012), which found that 330 
almost half of buyers of forest carbon credits (including Afforestation and Reforestation credits 331 
through the CDM) were motivated by either resale or investment or for regulatory or pre-regulatory 332 
reasons. In the voluntary market, recent commitments by companies to reduce deforestation in 333 
supply chains (UN 2014) and innovative moves to market REDD+ as a tool to reduce investment-risk 334 
offer potential. These voluntary actions raise the interesting proposition that at least some 335 
investment can be built on self-reinforcing action from within the private sector, with little or no 336 
government involvement. 337 
Consistent with Corbera and Schroeder (2011) this paper finds that investors in REDD+ have 338 
different motivations, from pre-regulatory purchasers to those looking to voluntarily offset 339 
emissions, to those looking to reduce deforestation in supply chains. Firms seeking regulatory credits 340 
(or pre-regulatory experience) were more interested in obtaining low-cost options, whilst those 341 
purchasing for CSR were more interested in co-benefits (see also Forest Trends 2014), and the 342 
associated PR. Differentiated motivations for investing in REDD+ imply policymakers in REDD+ 343 
jurisdictions and project developers need to offer a range of different products, or at least to better 344 
understand the differentiated market.  345 
A good understanding of the aims and function of REDD+, along with its values and risks, is lacking 346 
among many private sector investors. Both values and risks differ depending on motivations. But 347 
even where there is an awareness of risks, the private sector is unable to measure and quantify 348 
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these. REDD+ lies outside the main activities of most firms, and if they are unable to understand or 349 
quantify specific risks of a particular project or initiative, they may be reluctant to invest. Improved 350 
understanding of the risks involved in different projects and initiatives might help direct capital to 351 
those with a better chance of reaching their aims. This could benefit REDD+ by helping to reduce 352 
demand for riskier projects and initiatives.   353 
This lack of understanding regarding REDD+ (the ‘missing middle’) needs to be overcome if markets 354 
are to develop further. Helping to bridge this missing middle, aiding the private sector to understand 355 
the value that may arise from investing in REDD+ (and the positive impacts that REDD+ may bring to 356 
the environment and also to a company’s image), and to understand (and quantify) the risks that 357 
may be encountered through such investment, could boost private sector investment. Given the 358 
multiplicity of REDD+ projects and initiatives, workshop participants unanimously agreed that there 359 
needs to be movement towards creating unified packages of information regarding REDD+.  360 
In general, one of the greatest obstacles to innovation, especially in finance, is investors’ natural 361 
resistance to change and new products often fail because investors are reluctant to shift strategy. 362 
This challenge has been met by other products in the environmental sphere such as Green Bonds 363 
(Climate Bonds Initiative 2015). Aversion to change can be even greater when investors are required 364 
to assess new products on the market themselves. Providing suitable, reliable and comparable 365 
information might remove at least one obstacle to greater engagement of private sector finance 366 
with REDD+. 367 
Streamlining standards and the variety of certificates on offer could also reduce complexity for 368 
private sector decision-makers and might even help secure senior corporate backing. The recent 369 
growth in REDD+ standards and certificates mirrors the growth in certification schemes and eco-370 
labels for timber that occurred in the 1990s. Indeed, some of the arguments for standardising timber 371 
eco-labels and certification schemes, for instance, that the diversity of labels can be confusing for 372 
Page 16 of 34
Proof for Review
17 
 
 
consumers (making it difficult to compare products’ attributes) and weaken labels’ credibility (see 373 
Fischer et al. 2005), can also be applied to REDD+. Some degree of standardisation, under the 374 
auspices of the UNFCCC, might help raise understanding of the potential values and benefits of 375 
REDD+ and assist in the understanding, measuring and quantification of the risks involved.   376 
Given the scale of tropical deforestation, the current level of public and private investment to 377 
reduce it is tiny compared to what is required (CI 2013; GCP et al 2014). This is the case irrespective 378 
of whether REDD+ is implemented in the form of positive incentives (like payments for 379 
environmental services) or reducing deforestation in supply chains so that inputs to production can 380 
be certified as being ‘deforestation free’. Yet, at the scale of individual projects or jurisdictions such 381 
as Acre in Brazil (Climate Focus 2013), the private sector can potentially make a difference (see 382 
Edwards et al. 2014). Indeed, where the private sector is part of the problem, in the sense of 383 
supplying commodities that drive forest conversion, it can be argued that it should, as quoted by a 384 
workshop participant, 'pay someone to stop doing something', becoming part of the solution. Supply 385 
chains that are free of deforestation would be a step in this direction and efforts should be made to 386 
integrate these with JNR. 387 
For firms with operations not directly involved in deforestation, the problem with JNR is whether it 388 
will be sufficiently attractive and offer enough of a communicable storyline while providing sufficient 389 
finance to make it work. An institutional structure could be created that attracts a (capped) number 390 
of private sector partners to pool resources, at a size that allows each partner to obtain CSR benefits 391 
and retain sufficient ownership and control. Yet, the extent to which the private sector would be 392 
willing to get involved with a jurisdiction such as Acre in Brazil, whether individually or as part of a 393 
‘club’, remains to be seen. It may require the incorporation of the benefits of REDD+ that appear to 394 
make it attractive to the voluntary market, such as co-benefits and associated PR. But then REDD+ 395 
policy would need to be designed to tackle multiple objectives - likely to be more challenging than 396 
tackling the single objective of reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation.   397 
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Supplementary Material 1 
S1: REDD+ market context 2 
In the 2000s, private sector finance for REDD+ was expected to be predominantly generated from 3 
entities regulated under emissions trading schemes, with mandated emissions reductions partially 4 
met via the purchase of ‘offset’ credits from REDD+ projects (Clements 2010; Agrawal et al 2011; 5 
Phelps et al. 2011). For example, firms facing obligations under the European Union’s Emissions 6 
Trading Scheme (EU ETS) can use credits from Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint 7 
Implementation (JI) projects. The peak of private sector interest in REDD+ as a potential new 8 
investable asset class was just prior to 2009 (Forest Trends 2014), when the demand from regulatory 9 
markets was projected to rise in the near future. Investors saw opportunities to profit by selling on 10 
REDD+ credits to entities with potential future compliance needs under regulated emissions trading 11 
schemes, despite continued uncertainty over the future eligibility of REDD+ in the EU ETS.  12 
At present, only credits from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and Joint Implementation 13 
(JI) are eligible for use by EU ETS installations and although there has been some discussion 14 
regarding the inclusion of REDD+ in the CDM, this is unlikely to occur in the short-term. A general 15 
scepticism regarding future REDD+ compliance demand in Europe (communicated to the authors by 16 
a carbon market expert), and a move away from offsetting in the EU ETS, has been compounded by a 17 
lack of new carbon trading schemes to emerge since the EU ETS. Perhaps most significantly, the 18 
Waxman-Markey Bill in the USA proposed a national level cap-and-trade scheme that would have 19 
allowed between 500 million to 1 billion tonnes of REDD+ credit purchases by participating firms per 20 
year (Open Congress 2009).  Credits would have been sourced from eligible projects and countries, 21 
with a gradual movement towards a fully national-level approach, with purchases made directly 22 
from governments. The failure of the passage of the bill in the US Senate in 2009 reduced short-term 23 
expectations of the return from REDD+ investments, and removed the immediate prospects of 24 
national-level demand for REDD+ from the US.  25 
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Further damage to potential compliance demand for REDD+ came with the repeal of the Australian 26 
Carbon Pricing Mechanism in 2014. Although the Australian scheme had not yet granted eligibility to 27 
REDD+ credits it did represent a potential future source of demand, especially given close relations 28 
between Australia and Indonesia on REDD+, through the Indonesia-Australia Forest Carbon 29 
partnership that ran between 2009 and 2014. 30 
California is the only jurisdiction that has made concrete moves towards the inclusion of REDD+ 31 
offsets in a jurisdiction-scale climate policy framework.  It implemented a state-level cap-and-trade 32 
scheme in the absence of US national policy in January 2013, initially only allowing domestic offsets. 33 
Each regulated entity can use such offset credits to meet 8% of their annual emissions, with the use 34 
of international credits initially capped at 2%, before rising to 4%. Eligible REDD+ credits are likely to 35 
come initially from two jurisdictions, also States: Chiapas in Mexico and Acre in Brazil. Given that 36 
REDD+ is yet to enter into the Californian scheme, the future potential scale of investment remains 37 
speculative. GCP estimate that up to 80 million tonnes of REDD+ credits could be purchased by 38 
Californian regulated entities by 2020, about 70% of the proposed emission reductions in Acre, 39 
between 2015 and 2020 (GCP et al. 2014).  40 
Beyond the regulatory market, a market for those looking to voluntarily purchase REDD+ credits has 41 
emerged. This market is relatively small, especially in comparison to the potential REDD+ supply 42 
pipeline with an estimated 28 million tonnes of REDD+ credits purchased by a variety of different 43 
types of companies for voluntary reasons in 2012, for a total value of US$216 million, slightly less 44 
than the previous year (GCP et al. 2014). This demand is exceeded by the supply of credits generated 45 
by all current projects (GCP et al. 2014). In 2012 30 million tonnes of REDD+ credits from existing 46 
projects remained unsold, over 50% of the total supply in the pipeline for that year (Forest Trends 47 
2012). The implication of this unsold surplus can be seen in the reported prices for REDD+ credits, 48 
down from US$7.4/tCO2 in 2012 to an average of US$4.2/tCO2 in 2013 (Forest Trends 2014).  49 
 50 
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 60 
S2: Interview Guides 61 
Questions for entities focused on offsetting for compliance 62 
- What are the prospects of REDD+ playing a role in compliance markets? 63 
o Do you think there is potential interest from compliance buyers for REDD+ options? 64 
o On what time horizon do you sense that compliance purchasers are making decision 65 
regarding offset purchases? 66 
o What have been the main reasons why compliance entities have made decisions 67 
between different offsets? 68 
 How large a role has price vs other factors played in decision-making? 69 
o Who have been the key people in the organization regarding compliance purchases? 70 
 71 
Questions for existing REDD+ purchasers  72 
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 73 
- What have been the motivations of existing REDD+ purchasers?  74 
o What have been the key lessons from the experience of these existing purchasers?  75 
o Would jurisdictional REDD+ be as attractive to existing purchasers as project-based 76 
credits? 77 
o How important has price considerations been in non-compliance offset purchasers 78 
decision-making? 79 
- Who have been the key people in the organization regarding REDD+/offset purchases? 80 
- What are the main barriers to engaging private sector finance in REDD+? 81 
- What are the prospects for increasing non-compliance REDD+ demand? 82 
o What tools could be used to boost demand? 83 
 84 
Questions for Exchanges involved in carbon trading 85 
- What would be required to catalyse interest in the major exchanges in designing a REDD+ option 86 
market? 87 
- What would be the steps required to establish a REDD+ options market place? How does this 88 
mirror (or differ) the establishment of any other carbon offset market? How would this be 89 
different for an options approach? 90 
 91 
  92 
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S3: Workshop material 93 
Developing an Options Market and Complementary Financial Structures to Mobilize Private Capital 94 
for REDD+ and Manage Climate Policy Risks (Options Market and Risk-Reduction Tools for REDD+) 95 
- LSE – CMIA/IETA workshop – April 3, 2014 96 
 97 
Overall project background 98 
REDD+ is at a crossroads - discussions have advanced in the UNFCCC negotiations and readiness efforts are 99 
progressing with public financing but private capital is largely on the sidelines. A lack of demand is coupled 100 
with uncertainty and risks that hinder the implementation and development of supply. On the other hand 101 
regulated companies potentially face large carbon price uncertainty, generating significant risk. Options on 102 
REDD+ could provide a mechanism to mobilize private capital in the near and medium terms while offering 103 
business and governments a tangible hedging tool in today’s uncertain policy environment. NORAD is funding 104 
the Environmental Defense Fund, in collaboration with the LSE, IIASA and the Mercator Research Institute on 105 
Global Commons and Climate Change to undertake a project to develop an Options Market and 106 
Complementary Financial Structures to Mobilize Private Capital for REDD+ and Manage Climate Policy Risks. 107 
Project Outcomes 108 
The project aims to produce research papers and modeling tools to support REDD+ options transactions and 109 
other risk-management mechanisms, along with communications and policy advocacy documents for non-110 
technical audiences. The ultimate aim of the project is to facilitate at least one pilot transaction that 111 
demonstrates the options approach to REDD+ financing between private investors (possibly along with a public 112 
institution) and a REDD+ jurisdiction. 113 
Workshop Objectives  114 
LSE’s role in the project is to help to understand the current REDD+ demand context, and the future prospects 115 
for any REDD+ market. To facilitate this understanding LSE is engaging with a number of different actors 116 
involved in REDD+ and carbon markets. As part of this engagement LSE approached both CMIA and IETA for 117 
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their assistance. The result has been the proposal for a workshop to be held with members of both CMIA’s 118 
REDD+ Working Group and IETA’s Land/Use Forestry Working Group at LSE on Thursday April 3, from 12:30pm 119 
until 3:30pm.  120 
 121 
The workshop has two main objectives: the first is to canvass the expertise and experience of the members of 122 
the groups in answering the following questions:    123 
- What are the prospects of REDD+ playing a role in compliance markets? 124 
- What are the prospects for increasing non-compliance REDD+ demand? 125 
- What have been the motivations of existing REDD+ purchasers?  126 
- What have been the key lessons from the experiences of these existing purchasers?  127 
- What are the main barriers to engaging private sector finance in REDD+? 128 
- What are the main buyer, supplier and intermediary risks facing REDD+ today? 129 
 130 
The second objective is to present initial thinking from LSE and the wider project regarding the use of options 131 
and other financial tools to reduce risks to both REDD+ sellers and REDD+ buyers and how they may increase 132 
demand and/or mitigate risk. It is our hope that the workshop can build relationships that can provide avenues 133 
for dissemination of findings from the work of LSE and the wider project. 134 
Follow-ups and outputs 135 
The aim of the work being undertaken by the LSE is to produce a report outlining the current state of REDD+ 136 
demand, the perceptions of private sector operators as to the outlook given the current policy conditions and 137 
the interest, if any, in risk reduction tools such as options. The report from LSE will be complemented by a 138 
similar report from EDF focusing on perceptions in the United States. These reports will be accompanied by a 139 
programme of stakeholder engagement focusing on communicating the key messages to policy-makers, and 140 
also testing and refining the findings and messages from the study through further engagement with private 141 
sector stakeholders.     142 
  143 
Page 28 of 34
Proof for Review
Agenda 144 
The workshop will be built around three separate sessions. In each an LSE staff member will very 145 
briefly outline the topics of interest and our initial findings and thoughts on each topic before 146 
starting an open discussion focusing on the key questions within each topic.   147 
12:30pm – 1:00pm  Buffet Lunch and Greetings  148 
1pm – 1:15pm    Introduction 149 
1:15pm – 2:00pm   Where does REDD+ stand today? 150 
    5 minute presentation followed by open discussion on: 151 
o Prospects for Compliance/Non-compliance 152 
o Motivations for current purchasers 153 
o Lessons from previous experience 154 
o Jurisdictional v Project based approaches 155 
2:00pm – 2:45pm   Barriers and Risks to REDD+ 156 
    5 minute presentation followed by open discussion on: 157 
o Main barriers to engaging private sector 158 
o Main risks facing buyers, suppliers and intermediaries 159 
2:45pm – 3:30pm   The Future for REDD+ 160 
    5 minute presentation followed by open discussion on: 161 
o Options and other tools to reduce risk 162 
o Actions to enable interim financing 163 
o California possibilities 164 
o Post 2020 Prospects 165 
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Session 1 presentation: 166 
 167 
 168 
Where does REDD+ stand today?
Our thoughts
• There is no current demand for REDD+
• For REDD+ to enter into compliance markets it 
needs to be demonstrated
• Non-compliance motivations could assist in 
boosting interim demand
• Jurisdictional REDD+ may be less attractive to 
voluntary buyers
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 169 
Session 2 presentation: 170 
 171 
 172 
 173 
What we’d like to know
• What are the prospects of REDD+ playing a role in 
compliance markets?
• What are the prospects for increasing non-
compliance REDD+ demand?
• What have been the motivations of existing 
REDD+ purchasers? 
• What have been the key lessons from the 
experiences of these existing purchasers? 
The Value/Services 
from REDD+
Risks that 
Value/Services from 
REDD+ may not 
emerge
Understanding of the 
Value of 
REDD+/Capacity to 
understand risks
CSR
Supply chain 
greening
Compliance
Other?
Reputational 
risk
Political risk
Market risk
Ecological risk
Property 
rights?
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S4: Kering and REDD+  174 
Kering is a French multinational clothing and accessories company controlling global brands such as 175 
Puma and Gucci. The firm has a strong commitment to sustainability dating back to an original ethics 176 
charter issued in 1996. One of its subsidiaries, Puma, moved to Environmental Profit and Loss 177 
Accounting in 2011.  178 
As part of its sustainability strategy, Kering has committed to a number of environmental targets 179 
with direct or indirect relevance to forests. These include a commitment to offset all its emissions 180 
from Scope 1 and 2 activities – using offset programmes that contribute to the welfare of the 181 
community and the conservation of biodiversity in its regions of operations.. In order to help achieve 182 
this objective in 2012 Kering procured a 5% stake in Wildlife Works, a leading REDD+ project 183 
development and management company. This allowed Kering to take a place on the management 184 
committee of the company through which it procures the REDD+ credits that it uses to offset all its 185 
emissions.     186 
Kering’s engagement with REDD+, despite its relatively higher price than otherwise offset 187 
opportunities, fits within the overall target of its sustainability arm to:‘invest in for-profit businesses 188 
that incorporate biodiversity conservation and social concerns into their business model, resulting in 189 
net-positive social and environmental impacts.’  190 
The multiple benefits that REDD+ offers to Kering may well lie behind the companies large 191 
commitment to the asset class. Further REDD+ investments may also prove useful to meet other 192 
sustainability targets that Kering has set itself. The company has committed that 100% of the leather 193 
used in its products will be from sources that do not result in converting ecosystems into grazing or 194 
agricultural lands. REDD+’s potential role in providing green supply chains, along with offsetting 195 
carbon emissions may therefore offer strong motivations for companies with multiple sustainability 196 
objectives to invest in the asset.   197 
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S5: Ulu Masen REDD+ demonstration project 199 
The Ulu Masen REDD+ demonstration project, covering around 750,000 hectares in Aceh 200 
(Indonesia), was designed by Aceh’s Government in combination with the private company ‘Carbon 201 
Conservation’, and with some initial guidance from Flora and Fauna International (Institute for 202 
Global Environmental Strategies 2007). Merrill Lynch was reported to have invested US$9 million 203 
into the project in an arrangement that committed the bank to purchase US$9 million worth of 204 
credits with an option to buy further credits (Business Green 2008). The project was validated by the 205 
in 2008 but the validation subsequently expired and the project stalled, with no credits issued. Part 206 
of the land planned for the project has since been sold to a Canadian mining company (Sydney 207 
Morning Herald 2012).    208 
Business Green, (2008). Merrill Lynch throws weight behind avoided deforestation credits [www 209 
document]. URL http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/news/1806676/merrill-lynch-throws-210 
weight-avoided-deforestation-credits  211 
Institute for Global Environmental Strategies. (2007) Reducing carbon emissions from deforestation 212 
in the Ulu Masen Ecosystem, Aceh, Indonesia. Project design note for CCBA Audit (December 213 
29, 2007) [www document]. URL http://redd-214 
database.iges.or.jp/redd/download/project;jsessionid=F5414B40A100A330B258A615F9799215 
5C8?id=87  216 
Sydney Morning Herald. (2012) Credits lost in tangle of Aceh’s forests [www document]. URL 217 
http://www.smh.com.au/environment/conservation/credits-lost-in-tangle-of-acehs-forest-218 
20120608-201gl.html  219 
 220 
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